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8 Small States and the Internal 
Balance of the European 
Union: The Perspective of 
Small States 
RODERICK PACE 
Introdllction 
A satisfactory definition of a small state has not been found. Attempts to 
use quantitative criteria such as population and territorial size, gross 
domestic product and GOP per capita have not resolved the task 
successfully. 1 They rather fuelled more controversy. However, despite 
these theoretical drawbacks, there is no denying that the EU has become, 
and wi II increasingly become with successive enlargements, a Community 
of small states. This is illustrated by the information in the appendix to this 
chapter, (Table 3), which shows that in the present EU of fifteen Member 
States, only five countries have a population of more than 40 million. The 
rest of the Member States, except the Netherlands, have a population of 
around 10 million or less. The EU presently has 13 membership 
applications before it, including that of Turkey which is being kept in 
abeyance. This means that in the future, when the EU grows eventually to 
28 countries, as many as 19 Member States will have a population of 
around 10 million or less of which 11 will have around 5 million or less. 
The main debate in the EU has been directed at the effect that the 
growth in the number, heterogeneity and disparity of the Member States 
will have on the smooth and efficient functioning of the Union's 
institutions and its budget. One argument concerns the effect of enlarge-
ment on the ability of the EU to have an effective and coherent CFSP. 
Concerns about the EU budget focus on the effect of enlargement on the 
Union's main policies such as the CAP and the structural funds. 2 Other 
studies of the EU's institutional dynamics have concentrated on a power-
index approach, attempting to explore the patterns and permutations of 
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likely coalitions within the EU institutions. Yet other arguments concern 
the so called 'democratic' deficit and the digressive proportionality that 
favours small states. No proposal has been made to rescind the latter 
principle, however there is a consensus among the larger Member States 
that the weightings and representation in the Union's institutions should be 
recast to take more account of population strengths. Hence the proposals of 
double majorities of either votes and population, or votes and Member 
States, on which the larger Member States unequivocally agree, while the 
smaller ones unequivocally disagree. This was the maJor impasse of the 
1996IGC. 
The approach taken in this chapter steers a different course by con-
centrating on the special characteristics of small states that influence their 
behaviour in international relations with an eye to answering the following 
questions: 
1) Why do small countries seek membership of the EU? Can their aims be 
better attained in an alternative setting, such as a free trade area or a 
customs union? 
2) What will be the effect on the characteristics of the EU itself when a 
large number of small states join it? . 
In general, all states are concerned about their own security under-
stood in its wider meaning to comprise both the traditional or defence 
related aspects, as well as the broader concerns linked to economic 
stability, development, the social and material welfare of their citizens and 
the protection of the environment. 3 However, while the larger a state is the 
more resources and independence it has in tackling its security proble-
matique, the smaller a country is, the less it can rely on its own resources 
to achieve these tasks, since these by definition are limited, and therefore 
the greater is its dependence on the outside world. Thus for the small 
country, the solution to its security dilemma lies outside more than in the 
case of the larger states. 
Small states have a number of ways of tackling their problem. A lot of 
work has been done within the Commonwealth Secretariat on the economic 
and political viability of small states.4 This was due to the fact that as a 
result of the post-war independence movement and the dissolution of the 
British Empire, a large number of new states appeared on the world scene. 
In fact in the Commonwealth, 31 countries have a population of 1.5 million 
or less. This explains the interest of the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
However, a number of other writers have contributed to the analysis: 
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Rudolf J. Rummel and the pioneering work on the 'Dimensions of Nations' 
(DON, project of the 1960s, established a link between the economic 
development and the size of states and their participation in the 
intern ttional system.5 But since then there have been a number of other 
studiel, among them Annette Baker Fox's pioneering work and those of 
Davi<lVital and Michael Handel. 
Tie fall of communism and the break up of the Soviet Union and other 
Euro~ean federations, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, has led to a 
simila.r (although not completely the same) situation in Europe as that 
obtaiaing during the decolonisation period, where a number of small states 
have emerged on the political scene, all of them metaphorically knocking 
on the EU's doors for admission. The presumption in this chapter is that 
the theories developed in the analysis of small states in international 
relatiolls or that have been applied to the better understanding of their 
unique sociological and economic structures, could also be applied, 
together with other approaches that are in the main stream of the current 
analysis of the EU, to achieve a fuller understanding of the internal and 
external dynamics ofthe Union. 
The s(lecial characteristics and behaviour of small states 
The key concept in understanding the nature of small states is 
'vulneJability' in political, economic and strategic terms.6 Briefly these 
refer t<J: 
• Economic Vulnerabilities: 7 small population and land area, limited 
resources, but high population density; inability to benefit from 
economies of scale; greater reliance on trade, therefore trade/GOP 
ratio is very high, i.e. relatively more open economies and hence more 
vulnerable to international economic instability and greater external 
dependencies; little or no control over macroeconomic policy; high per 
capita costs of maintaining basic services such as the utilities (supply 
of water, electricity, telecommunications) and ports; a shortage of 
human resources to run the basic institutions that are required of a 
modem country and for information gathering. The latter, in particular, 
negatively affects their foreign policy-making.8 Small states tend to 
have a very narrow focus in foreign policy, although not exclusively 
SO.9 This aspect will be further elaborated in the last part of this 
section. 
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• Security: Two fonns of threats to the smalI states' territorial integrity 
can be singled out: the classical military ones and the non~military 
ones such as those coming from private, non-governmental sources. In 
the contemporary world, the latter occur more frequently than the 
fonner. Militarily, a small state and especially a microstate is by 
definition a weak state, unless special extenuating circumstances 
reduce this weakness. Geography may also make the small state more 
vulnerable especially if it is situated in a strategic area, if it is 
surrounded by more powerful neighbours and if it still has unresolved 
border disputes or minority issues which can be exploited by third 
countries. Economic instability and weakness also reduce security. 
While in general the big powers or super powers are militarily 
vulnerable to threats from similar sized countries, small countries are 
open to threats from all comers. 
• Foreign Policy: The small independent state has to perform all the 
basic requirements of a state - maintaining representation in the 
international institutions, diplomatic representation in what it con-
siders as the 'key' capitals, infonnation gathering and processing. The 
limited resource base of small states puts a serious constraint on their 
ability to meet all their aspirations iil foreign policy or to be able to act 
on the basis of reliable and early infonnation. The latter limitation puts 
small states in a double constraint: being weak they have a greater 
stake in influencing the international environment in which they have 
to survive, however due to their lack of resources they can achieve 
much below their aspirations than larger states. To economise in the 
use of resources, smaller states try to achieve their aims in concert 
with other states, not necessarily small or weak states. Hence the 
importance they attach to action through international organisations 
and multilateral initiatives, as well as the upholding of international 
law and nonns. 
Applying these notions to the applicant countries 
Small European states achieve political and economic gains from a 
relationship with the EU and this is singularly testified to by the fact that 
they have launched their membership applications. Vital argues that the 
amalgamation of small states has a great deal to recommend it. 10 The main 
advantages that can be identified are: 
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• Uninpeded market access where they can diversify their exports and 
overcome the limitations of their small domestic market and make 
pos~ible the achievement of economies of scale in a number of sectors. 
The:: importance of the single market for the small countries is 
expected to grow with the introduction of the single currency which 
will further free them from the vicissitudes of multiple and fluctuating 
exc~ange rates. 
• For most of the developing small states of Europe, the EU is the main 
sotarce of foreign direct investment as this moves from the core when 
it lases its competitiveness, to the periphery attracted by the prospects 
that production of goods and services there will continue to enjoy 
unimpeded access and free circulation in the rest of the EU. 
• In tlte membership context, the EU becomes a source of structural aid 
to llelp them augment their economic development policies, develop 
hUnian resources and sharpen their abilities to attract more foreign 
dire::t investment. Small countries lacking the resources and the 
critical mass needed to mount independent research and development 
or human resource development programmes of the type launched by 
the larger countries, find that pan-European networks, despite their 
limitations, allow them to participate and gain access to a larger effort. 
Pan·European networks are more crucial than the national initiatives 
in small states, although the latter are normally encouraged as a means 
of hooking on to the larger European networks. 
• Small states have in the past attempted to safeguard their security in a 
number of ways but primarily by either joining an alliance or by 
embarking on a policy of neutrality or non-alignment. An alliance with 
other small and weak states is ineffectual when seriously threatened. A 
bila1eral alliance with a stronger power may turn the small state into a 
client state of the former. As history has shown, non-alignment has not 
made countries impervious to threats and challenges from the 
superpowers or co-members of the Movement. Neutrality'S highest 
value as a safeguard for a state's security occurs when the neutral state 
concerned can adequately safeguard it with its own resources. This too 
is a rare occurrence. Therefore, by becoming a member of the EU, a 
small state will be effectively joining a 'security community', 
dispensing with the need of formally entering a multilateral or bilateral 
alliance. As the case of Ireland, Finland, Austria and Sweden shows, 
renouncing neutrality may not even be necessary at all. 
• Small states joining the EU gain greater influence in international 
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relations firstly by increased access to the main capitals of Europe than 
would otherwise be the case if they stay out. This advantage was 
neatly summarised by Luxembourg's Foreign Minister in 1997. II 
Secondly, they participate in the institutions of the EU as a world actor 
and hence are transformed from 'system ineffectual' to 'system 
affecting' states to use R.O. Keohane's famous definition.12 
Some of the economic objectives outlined in this section can also be 
achieved by a free trade area or customs union agreement with the EU, but 
the security objectives that have defence implications cannot be achieved 
in the same way, unless a state is also a member of a strong alliance such 
as in the case of Norway and Iceland. Free trading with the EU has other 
drawbacks, particularly that it requires more than just the removal of tariff 
barriers to trade as understood in its classical meaning. Increasingly, in 
order to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade, third countries concluding a 
free trade agreement with the EU, such as the Mediterranean states that 
participate in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, are obliged to adopt 
substantial parts of the acquis communautaire in a number of sectors, 
particularly in the area of standards and competition policy. The parts of 
the acquis that are taken on by third countries in such circumstances need 
then to be updated regularly as they evolve in the EU, with one major 
difference: that EU countries participate in the decision-making process, 
third countries obviously do not. 
Therefore, a free trade area or customs union may offer some of the 
economic advantages of membership, but for the reasons outlined above, it 
also imposes a number of constraints which can also transform the 
relationship into a core-periphery one, particularly in situations where the 
level of economic development of the non-EU partner is still much below 
the EU average. A free trade area or customs union agreement can also 
increase the external economic dependence of the smaller state on the EU 
and impose severe limitations on the small state's macro-economic policy 
management. Indeed, because the trade dependence of small states tends to 
be high, a small state cannot afford to have its main macro-economic 
indicators (especially inflation and the exchange rate) differ significantly 
from those of the EU without incurring costs. A further problem is that 
openness of the economy may lead to a situation in which the government 
of a small state loses control over its development strategy. Finally, the 
free trade area or customs union, do not offer defence-related solutions to 
the 'unaligned' state which may thus find itself having to resort to less 
optimal arrangements in order to fill this void. 
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To be i~ or out - weighing the costs and benefits of membership 
Small c:ountries confronting the question of their future relations with the 
EU, i.e_ membership or a free trade area/customs union, have to weigh the 
costs and benefits of their moves. As a general rule, although it is more 
advanta..~eous for small countries to be in rather than out of the EU, there 
are exanples, such as in the case of Iceland and Norway, where for 
overridilg economic concerns, membership is perceived to be more 
disadvalltageous than advantageous in the present circumstances. For other 
reasons, Switzerland also does not contemplate joining the EU in the 
foreseeable future. 
It h!s been argued that small countries are jealous of their identity and 
should t~erefore not feel comfortable about joining a community of states 
where iheir sovereignty and independence is further diluted. Two 
importallt considerations need to be made here. The first concerns the 
process [)f globalisation and the forces of interdependence that have and 
continue to change the very nature of state sovereignty in its traditional 
meaning. In other words, what is the extent of the 'real' freedom and 
sovereigllty that any state, particularly a small state enjoys in world politics 
today? fhe question of how far are small states 'penetrated' by 
transnati[)nal forces is relevant. Forthermore, looking beyond the formal 
independence of many states, how really independent, as opposed to 
interdependent are states in the world? Therefore, for the small state, the 
antimonde case of not joining the EU is not simply that of surviving in a 
world of lesser constraints. Indeed, the dangers and pressures could be 
greater outside, than inside the Union. 
The second consideration devolves from the very nature of the EU 
itself: does it really affect the independence and sovereignty of states so 
drastically? If the EU is an intergovernmental organisation as the liberal 
intergovernmentalists argue, then the EU strengthens the nation state. If it 
is a 'centralising' political entity, than all its Member States face the 
danger of being eventually sunk in the same melting pot, with the higher 
probability that the smaller and weaker ones would melt first. On the other 
hand if it is a multi-level polity, then the implications for state sovereignty 
are less clear because comparisons need to be made with the situation 
obtaining in the non-membership scenario and the trade-offs involved. In 
such comparisons, the economic implications can be easier to quantifY than 
the political and security ones, and therefore in many cases the argument 
has to take place at a high level of generality and remains generally 
inconclusive. 
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The EU as a multi-level polity 
The discussion of the 'identity' of the EU in the context of this chapter, has 
two important implications: is the EU's structure such that it is conducive 
to the survival of the small state within it and how will the EU be affected 
by enlargement? 
The intelligent and provocative analysis advanced by S. Hoffmann13 
that European integration has strengthened the European nation-state, the 
international regime approach as developed by Keohane and Nye l4 and 
Andrew Moravcsik's Iiberal-intergovernmentalism,ls namely that the EU 
has evolved into an international organisation controlled by its Member 
States to perform tasks they would otherwise be unable to achieve on their 
own, has not withstood the criticism of the multi-level polity school. On 
the other hand, the problem of defining the EU still defies scholars. 
In as far as its supranational element is concerned, the EU bears a 
family resemblance to a federal structure while its intergovernmental 
pillars pertain more to the confederal model. The influence of American 
federalism is historically undeniable. Even today, reference is frequently 
made to the American experience when for example analysing the effects 
of European Monetary Union. However, the difference between American 
federalism and the European model are obviously enormous. As Philippe 
Schmitter argues, virtually no one seems to believe that the United States 
of America offers an attractive vorhild to Europeans.16 
William Wallace has also depicted the EU as a confederation. 17 This 
harks back to the first American confederal constitution, which according 
to K.C. Wheare, is illustrated by the degree to which the general govern-
ment was authorised to operate upon the state governments only and not 
upon the people. IS However, other confederal models have existed in 
Europe, not least among them in the Netherlands in the 17th century and in 
Switzerland, that have at various times influenced European thinking. 
Although Altiero Spinelli's attempt to write a European federal consti-
tution, the nadir of European federalists, failed in the early I 980s, many of 
the ideas that that particular exercise proposed, have entered the European 
agenda. European federalism whose intellectual roots go back to the works 
of William Penn, the Abbe Saint-Pierre, Montesquieu, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, De 
Tocqueville, Count Codenhove-Kalergi and Aristide Briand still exercises 
a powerful influence on European integration. Ernest B. Haas, the high 
priest of neofunctionalism, attributed to David Mitrany - whose functio-
nalism was diametrically opposed to federalism - the dictum that 
The Perspective o/Small States 115 
functiOilaIism was 'federalism by instalments.'19 
Fnm its inception, the EU was never intended to be a centralised state. 
Jean r...!onnet warned against seeing the Community as a potential 19th 
centu~ state20 and J.H.H. Weiler argues that the lelos of the EU is a union 
of peoples and not a statal one.21 Weiler distinguishes between two 
approa~hes in European integration, the 'unity' vision that is epitomised by 
federal ism and the 'supranational' or community vision, which he favours, 
and wl:1ich seeks to create a new regime that tames the national interest 
with a- new discipline.22 The pillar structure of the Union itself, the 
commi1ment to preserve the identity of the Member States23 and the 
princip Ie of subsidiarity,24 enshrined in the Treaties, mean that the EU as a 
decentnlised multi-level polity is a formally accepted fact. The identity of 
the natiDn-state in Europe is so strong that centralising forces are bound to 
continlJ.e to be strongly resisted. This resistance may also increase the more 
Member States that join the EU and the more distant from the decision-
making institutions that the citizens feel. Of course, the application of the 
princip1e of subsidiarity is still a very nebulous and a contested one. 
A multi-level polity such as the one in which the EU has evolved, 
having both the characteristics of federalism and confederalism as 
described above, whether it is depicted as a federal-like structure (John 
Pinder'5 neo-federalism) or 'peripheralised federalism' as applied by 
William Riker,2s offers advantages as well as fundamental challenges to the 
small stilte in so far as the federal or supranational elements are not of the 
centralising kind. The participation of small states, jealously conscious of 
their identity strengthen the tendencies towards decentralisation. The other 
fundam~ntal advantages for small states are: 
I. Federalism, from its classical conception, perceived as being based on 
a pact (Latin foedus), provides a sound basis for the maintenance of 
peace between the members of the federation or league, a common 
defence against third countries and contributes towards universal 
peace (Kant, Mill and Montesquieu down to the more modern 
federalists). This is still the function of the EU in contemporary 
Europe. 
2. Federalism helps states attain non-defence related aims, such as 
economic welfare (Proudhon). As David McKay26 argues - using a 
modified model of Riker's 'fundamental bargain'27 as the basis of a 
federal union to comprise non-defence related goods - that this is also 
one of the main current functions of the EU. 
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Therefore, federalism as a non-centralising force, lacking a statal 
telos, seems to be conducive to the achievement of all the foreign policy 
aims of small states in international relations as briefly outlined in the 
earlier sections of this chapter. Hence the EU as a federal-like and at the 
same time a confederal-type multi-level polity offers many advantages to 
small states. It offers them security without the dangers of alliance while 
its looseness allows them to maintain their identities. Of course, a centra-
lising federalism can have the opposite effect, in which case for the small 
state, staying out of the Union may be more beneficial than joining it. 
In sum, C.J. Friedrich's espousal of Sir J.A.R. Mariott's idea, that the 
small state and the small political Community can only survive in a federal 
system if this is recognised as a useful instrument of good governance, 
seems to be borne out by the arguments advanced above.28 
Of course, from the de-colonisation experience, especially in the 
Caribbean, small state federations have not at first been very successful. 
Special circumstances prevalent then, particularly the need to affirm their 
identity following independence can explain this. However, in the new 
European conjecture of the 1990s, small states that have broken off from 
federal systems want to join the EU. 
The impact ofsmall states on the internal balance of the Union 
The reform of the EU's institutions is crucial for the smaller states not only 
because it has an impact on their own place in the Union but also because 
it sets the stage for the future development of the EU. From earlier on in 
the current institutional debate in the EU, the larger countries challenged 
the concept of digressive proportionality. This stance is largely summa-
rised in the opinions voiced by the German COU through Karl Lamers, 
when the principle of a double majority of votes and population was first 
elaborated.29 The smaller states of the Union showed extreme sensitivity to 
the question of institutional reform treating it as an attempt by the larger 
states to reverse the principle of digressive proportionality. For example, 
in the 1992 Benelux Memorandum JO the three countries maintained that in 
the institutional reform to face the challenge of enlargement, the larger 
countries would have to accept some over-representation of the smaller 
member countries. Their demands included a rotating presidency, a 
digressive proportionality in the EP, representation on the basis of one-
member-per-member-state in the Court of Justice and the Commission, 
while qualified majority weightings in Council would not allow the larger 
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countrL<:> to impose their will, while smaller countries would be unable to 
block <lteisions. 
Tt.e Lamers proposals, however, were not a straightforward redi-
stributi <n of power among the Member States. He was also proposing a 
strengthening of the EU as a multi-level polity. In brief, Lamers proposed:31 
• Th~ strengthening of subsidiarity based on the twin objective of (a) 
draving up a clearly defined list of competencies and political 
resp:msibilities for both the EU and the Member States; this would list 
the: ~wers to create policies and list the competencies related to areas 
of pm:ial authorities which means providing for exemptions; and (b) 
Legll protection of the principle of 'loyalty to the Union' meaning not 
only that the Members States are obliged to respect the Union but also 
thatthe latter is obliged to respect national competencies, and further, 
that in safeguarding its powers it must take into account the domestic 
strUttures of Member States. 
• Development of the EP with equal rights as the Council, the latter 
takimg the role of a Parliamentary second chamber as well. The EP will 
also be given the right of initiative. Obligatory working contacts with 
the lIational parliaments. 
• Introouction of double majority voting in the Council. 
• Adaptation of the rotating Presidency so that one of the large Member 
States will always form part of the Troika. 
• Strengthening of the Presidency of the Commission and abolishing the 
principle of one Commissioner per member state; appointing deputy 
Commissioners without voting rights thus ensuring the representation 
of all Member States in the Commission. 
• 'Variable geometry' and 'multi-speed' approach to integration should 
be approved and institutionalised by Treaty, in other words the idea of 
flexibility. 
The 1996 IGC has achieved some of these proposals: the powers of the 
EP have been increased, but not so much as Lamers had urged; the prin-
ciple of the rotating presidency, so that the Troika would always include a 
large member state, was achieved before the start of the conference; a form 
of variable geometry has become accepted; the abolition of one Commis-
sioner per member state lis not complete yet, but has to be put in place 
before the next enlargement. In the CFSP neutral states have been given 
the freedom to 'opt out'. 
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The entry of the current applicants in the EU will have a number of 
repercussions, which again for the sake of brevity are listed below: 
• The small/large state cleavage will increase making it more difficult in 
the future to strengthen the position of the bigger Member States in the 
institutions. 
• This cleavage might also reflect itself in the EU's external action: due 
to their long-standing and wider historic links, the larger Member 
States will continue to have a wider vision of world events, while the 
smaller states, especially those facing larger and potentially hostile 
non-Member States, will focus more narrowly on their immediate 
security concerns. 
• The new Member States will accentuate existing or add new security 
concerns and new sensitivities to the Union: the smaller countries such 
as the Baltic states,32 Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta lie on the edge of 
Europe's security zone. However, these sensitivities are not limited to 
the micro-applicants. Larger states in Central and Eastern Europe want 
to use their membership not only to consolidate their transition to a 
market economy, but also to meet some of their 'hard' security con-
cerns linked to the possibility of a return of Russian pressures in the 
region. Many of them have unresolved minority issues; Turkey, by no 
measure a small state, is in the sensitive region facing the Middle East 
and the Caucasus, though some of its concerns are catered for by her 
membership ofNATO.33 
• Small states are not by definition more pacific-leaning than larger 
ones. However, a number of the small applicant states or those that 
have already joined, are either neutral (Malta) or have been active in 
the non-aligned movement (Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia as part of 
Yugoslavia). This may induce a generally more 'pacifist' CFSP. Some 
will also import serious problems into the Union like Cyprus and the 
Baltic states vis-a-vis Russia. 
• In internal policy-making, small states, which have a basic lack of 
information sources, are mostly likely to rely upon the information 
they can obtain from the supranational institutions, particularly the 
Commission. This means that the Commission will gather new allies 
in the decision-making, strengthening its role as a policy engineer and 
agenda setter (both formal and informal). 
• From the economic standpoint, the smaller states will neither add 
much to the Union's resources nor be a major strain on its budget. The 
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EU's major challenge is the successful absorption of the larger 
cc.mtries like Poland and eventually Turkey. 
Concluion 
The ai n of this chapter was to identify the general issues concerned with 
the nexl enlargement and the participation in it of a large number of small 
states. The approach applied in this paper is not intended to supplant but 
rather t~ supplement other approaches. A number of hypotheses have been 
put fonard: that small states have special interests related to their size; 
that wilen they approach the EU for membership or some other form of 
relationhip to it, they do this to address their special interests; that not all 
political structures of the Union fit their aims: a loose, multi-level polity is 
more c<JOducive to their needs than a centralising one; that the participation 
of small states in the EU will therefore strengthen the 'looseness' of the 
EU as a multi-level polity; however, they will also strengthen supra-
national institutions such as the Commission with whom they will align 
themselves to fill their informational void. 
Lastly, the arguments advanced in this chapter have by no means 
exhausted the subject. Some of them have been advanced with some 
'poetic licence' as potential avenues for further empirical research. 
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Appendix:TabJe 3 The European Union and small states: some key statistics 
Country Population Size GDP GDP Per Capita Council NATO 
(millions) Sq miles '000 bnUSS USS of 
frank] [rank] Jrankl [rank] Europe 
Austria • 8.1 [16] 32.4 [15] 233.3 [7] 28,997 [3] Yes No 
Belgium • 10.2 [12] 11.8 [24] 269.2 [9] 26,556 [5] Yes Yes 
Bulgaria 1 8.3 [17] 44.4 [12] 8 [24] 909 [27] Yes No 
Cyprus 1 0.74 [26] 3.6 [26] 8.5 [23] 11,564 [14] Yes No 
Czech Repub 1 10.3 [11] 30.5 [16] 45.7 [17] 4,420 [19] Yes No 
Denmark • 5.3 [19] 16.6 [22] 173.3 [10] 33,144 [1] Yes Yes 
Estonia 1 1.5 [25] 17.4 [21] 3.62 [27] 2,262 [24] Yes No 
Finland • 5.1 [20] 130.1 [6] 125 [12] 24,467 [9] Yes No 
France • 58.5 [4] 220.6 [2] 1,537.60 [2] 26,445 [6] Yes Yes 
Germany • 82 [1] 137.8 [5] 2,412.50 [1] 29,542 [2] Yes Yes 
Greece • 10.5 [10] 51.2 [11] 77.8 (94) [15] 7,458 (94) [16] Yes Yes 
Hungary 1 10.2 [13] 35.9 [14] 43.7 [18] 4,273 [20] Yes No 
Ireland • 3.7 [21] 27.1 [17] 64.3 [16] 17,965 [12] Yes No 
Italy • 57.5 [5] 116.3 [8] 1,087.20 [4] 18,984 [10] Yes Yes 
Latvia 1 2.5 [23] 24.9 [19] 4.5 [26] 1,649.70 [25] Yes No 
Lithuania 1 3.7 [22] 25.2 [18] 5.96 [25] 1,568 [26] Yes No 
Luxembourg • 0.42 [27] 0.99 [27] 10.6 (92) [22] 26,866 [4] Yes Yes 
Malta 1 0.37 [28] 0.12 [28] 2.4 [28] 6,593 [18] Yes No 
Netherlands • 15.6 [9] 15.8 [23] 395.5 [6] 25,597 [8] Yes Yes 
Poland 1 38.6 [7] 120.7 [7] 118 [13] 3,057 [22] Yes No 
Portugal • 9.9 [14] 36.4 [13] 99.8 [14] 10,060 [15] Yes Yes 
Romania 1 22.6 [8] 91.7 [10] 21 [19] 893 [28] Yes No 
Slovakia 1 5.4 [18] 18.9 [20] 17.4 [20] 3,271 [21] Yes No 
Slovenia 1 1.99 [24] 7.8 [25] 14.2 [21] 7,100 [17] Yes No 
Spain • 39.3 [6] 194.9 [3] 559.6 [5] 14,272 [13] Yes Yes 
Sweden • 8.8 [15] 173.7 [4] 230.6 [8] 26.096 [7] Yes No 
Turkey 1 63.2 
m 
301.4 [1] 169.3 [11] 2,747 [23] Yes Yes 
U. K.. 58.9 94.2 [9] 1,101.80 [3] 18,799 [11] Yes Yes 
l=applicant *=member 
Source: Eurostat, OECD Statistics and IMF. Figures in brackets indicate ranking. 
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